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The number of Italian firms in function of the number of workers is well approximated by an
inverse power law up to 15 workers but shows a clear downward deflection beyond this point, both
when using old pre-1999 data and when using recent (2014) data. This phenomenon could be
associated with employent protection legislation which applies to companies with more than 15
workers (the Statuto dei Lavoratori). The deflection disappears for agriculture firms, for which the
protection legislation applies already above 5 workers. In this note it is estimated that a correction
of this deflection could bring an increase from 3.9 to 5.8% in new jobs in firms with a workforce
between 5 to 25 workers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The average number of workers per company in Italy is
much lower than the EU average: 3.9 versus 6.1 [1]. This
relative smallness of Italian firms is often seen as one of
the causes of the weakness of the Italian economy in the
global markets. One hypothesis that has been advanced
to explain the phenomenon is that the Italian legislation
makes it costly for a company to grow to over 15 workers
because above this threshold the legislation known as the
Statuto dei Lavoratori (Worker’s Statute) applies. This
includes, in particular, the restrictions on firing workers
with open-ended contracts (the so-called Art. 18 ). In
the case of agriculture firms, the Statuto applies already
above 5 workers. The strong financial compensation to
the fired employee enforced in some cases by the Art. 18,
in addition to the risk of a forced reinstatement and a
long legal litigation, could lead some companies to choose
to remain undersized [2]. A concise and clear history of
the employment protection in Italy can be found in [10]
and will not be repeated here.
In order to test the hypothesis that the Statuto limits
the growth, we analyse here three sets of data, one ob-
tained by an average over the years 1986-1999 for all the
Italian private firms between 5 and 25 workers (we denote
it as pre-1999 data, [3]) and two for year 2014 [11] for the
same workforce range. The 2014 data has been collected
separately for agriculture firms (we denote this dataset as
Agri2014 data) and for the rest (we denote this as 2014
data) in order to further test the effect of the threshold at
15 workers. Some global figure about the three datasets
are reported in Tab. I. In all cases the workforce includes
open-ended as well as temporary workers at the time of
the recording. The definition of agriculture firms in the
Agri2014 data is not completely equivalent to the legal
definition for as concerns the Statuto so the Agri2014
data for firms above 15 workers might be contaminated
by an unknown number of firms that are actually sub-
ject to the Statuto provisions; what is important for the
present analysis, however, is that all the firms with more
than 15 workers in the 2014 dataset are subject to the
Statuto. For the pre1999 data, the agriculture firms are
data firms approx. workers
pre-1999 253562 2,491,000 [3]
2014 356602 3,401,000 [11]
Agri 21258 193,000 [11]
Table I: Firm data
included in the dataset. As one can see from the relative
numbers in Tab. I, however, the fraction of the agricul-
ture firm should be rather small.
The pre1999 and the 2014 datasets are shown in Fig.
(1) in logarithmic coordinates. Denoting with n(A) the
number of firms with A workers, we show on the ordi-
nate the total number A · n(A) of workers in firms with
A workers. The trend appear quite similar, a part for
the absolute values. In both cases, an initial straight line
(i.e. an inverse power law) gives way near 15 workers
to a quite steeper downward curve, which is also as a
first approximation an inverse power law. In Fig. (2) we
compare instead the 2014 data with the Agri2014 data,
rescaled by an arbitrary factor 12 in order to bring them
closer to the 2014 data. As it appears quite clearly, the
Agri2014 data do not show any obvious departure from
a straight line, although they have a much larger scatter
due to their smaller absolute values. The visual inspec-
tion of Figs. (1) and (2) seems therefore to support our
initial hypothesis. The rest of this paper is devoted to
test it quantitatively and to extract some possible esti-
mate of how many jobs the removal or attenuation of the
provisions of the Statuto could induce.
II. THE PRE-1999 DATA
In a work of Schivardi and Torrini in 2008 [3], the pre-
1999 data for the roughly 250,000 Italian companies ac-
tive in the period 1986 to 1998 has been analyzed. The
average n(A) of the number of firms as a function of the
number of workers is shown in Fig. (3) in log-log co-
ordinates. The authors of Ref. [3] find that the effect
of the downward turn around 15 workers is statistically
significant but is relatively small and its removal would
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Figure 1: Total number of workers employed in firms with a
given number of workers for the pre-1999 data (red circles)
and for the 2014 data (blue squares).
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Figure 2: Total number of workers employed in firms with a
given number of workers for the 2014 data (blue squares) and
for the Agri2014data (black circles).
bring only a 0.5% to 1% increase in jobs. This result
was obtained by estimating the probability of firms to
hire (probability that a company increases the number
of workers) averaged over the years. This probability
shows a small dip, or anomaly, around 15 workers, that
amounts to a 2% decrease in the probability of hiring.
The hypothesis of the work [3] is that the effect of that
depression can be corrected by estimating what the de-
viation is with respect to the average performance before
and after the threshold. This method implicitly assumes
that the behavior of firms before and after the threshold
is similar, that is, not influenced by the Statuto dei La-
voratori or other external factors, and that an anomaly
exists only in the immediate vicinity of the transition
from below to above threshold. This assumption, how-
ever, seems at odds with Figs. 1 or 3, in which it is clear
that the data do not show a simple subsidence around
15 workers but rather a systematic decrease with a dif-
ferent trend whose effects extend to at least 25 work-
ers. Moreover, the restrictions imposed by the Statuto
are not fixed-cost ones since the cost of firing is propor-
tional to the number of workers that could potentially
be fired and therefore to the total number of workers.
One should then expect an effect that persists also for
firms well above the threshold. In Ref. [10] the authors
find indeed that the behavior of firms with respect to
the employment of temporary workers (not protected by
law) changes quite significantly below and above thresh-
old and that this change is detectable up to at least firms
with 25 workers.
A statistically significant reduction between 1% and
5% growth rate for companies with 15 workers in a sam-
ple of 2572 companies was also obtained in [9] but the
employment consequences have not been quantified.
As already mentioned, the pre-1999 data includes all
types of private activity, including agriculture firms to
which the Statuto dei Lavoratori legislation applies al-
ready above 5 workers. However these firms are typically
very few and very small: the fraction of agriculture firms
with 15-25 workers is less than 1% of the total number of
firms in our 2014 data. Therefore we can safely neglect
the effect of this component in our results.
The inflection point in Fig. (3) can be estimated
from the data itself, without prior knowledge of a cer-
tain threshold. To this aim, we employed the RANSAC
algorithm [12], which consists in a search of a best fit
composed of two independent straight lines on the log-
log plane logn, logA. In all the simulations performed
with various probability threshold (points farther than 2
or 3σ are rejected from the consensus fit), the intersection
between the two lines has always been correctly identi-
fied in the vicinity of 15 workers and most of the points
upstream and downstream of the threshold have been
assigned to the two different power laws. The existence
of a statistically significant change around 15 workers is
thus confirmed independently of the hypothesis that it is
caused by legislation. This implies that the firm distri-
bution shows a discontinuity in its first derivative rather
than in the distribution itself (the continuity of the dis-
tribution has been ascertained also in [10]). Given the
existence of a statistically significant break, one should
fit separately the trend below and above threshold.
The curve for A = 5 − 15 appears to be very well
described by a power law (Pareto distribution) obtained
by the method of least squares
nfit(A) = 105.838±0.006A−(1.645±0.007) (1)
This estimate includes Poisson errors in the number of
firms, ∆n/n = 1/
√
n, although the effect of the errors is
negligible (they would appear smaller than the symbols
used in Fig.3.) The data for A > 16 lie systematically
below the power law. The slope of the best fit is −1.645
for A = 5− 15, steepens to −2.34 if one fits in the range
A = 16− 25 and is −1.82 if one fits the entire sequence;
a power law fit applied to the entire sequence does not
appear, however, statistically acceptable.
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Figure 3: The dots represent the number of firms as a function
of the number of workers (elaboration of data from Ref. [3]).
The dashed line indicates the best fit from 5 to 14 workers
(blue circles). Subsequent points (red squares) differ signifi-
cantly from the extrapolated behavior. The continuous line
is obtained by rescaling the best fit in order to provide the
same total number of companies (fixed-slope scenario).
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Figure 4: Total number of workers per worker bin. As in Fig.
1, the dashed line indicates the best fit from 5 to 15 workers
(blue circles). The continuous line is obtained by rescaling
the best fit in order to provide the same total number of
companies (fixed-slope scenario). The grey region denotes
the total number of new workers in firms above 15 workers
one would obtain if the change in slope could be removed.
A similar effect was found in France [5] near the thresh-
old of 50 workers, beyond which a number of protective
regulations and tax compliance come into effect. Accord-
ing to [5], the power law n(A) has a slope of -1.82 (be-
tween 10 and 1000 workers), virtually identical to what
we find in Italy between 5 and 25 workers. In France
there are however other thresholds at 10 and 20 workers
so the comparison is not straightforward [6].
We can now try to estimate the effect of removing the
causes of the change in slope, whether they are associated
to legislation or not. To do so we make a first crucial
hypothesis (power-law hypothesis): that the distribution
of firm sizes when no artificial restriction on growth are
imposed is a power law. This hypothesis is based on
the fact that indeed a power law has been found to be a
good approximation to firm distribution in the US [7], in
France [5] (with a break around 50 as mentioned), in our
own data separately below and after the break at A = 15.
Even where a small deviation from a power law over large
size intervals has been observed, for instance in Dutch
manifacturing firms [8], a power law approximation looks
very reasonable in the range below 25 workers.
Once the shape of the trend is fixed, we are left with
just two parameters, normalization and slope. Since we
are trying to forecast a redistribution of firms regard-
less of their birth or mortality rates, we will assume that
the number of firms remain constant after the barrier
removal. This leaves a single parameter to fit, either
the slope or the normalization or a combination thereof.
Next, we make a second crucial assumption, to be re-
ferred to as the growth hypothesis, namely, that the num-
ber of small firms will not increase in number as a con-
sequence of the barrier removal. This seems very reason-
able, since it would be rather hard to explain why the
number of small firms should increase when a barrier to
growth has been removed. One could argue perhaps that
the current legislation is also a barrier to decrease, be-
cause it forces the firms to retain workers that would oth-
erwise be fired. This explanation is however untenable,
first because a firm could anyway reduce its employment
by simply ceasing the natural turn-over and secondly be-
cause a firm will anyway fire its workers if the financial
conditions require it, or else it would fail. If we assume
then that the small firms do not increase in number, then
there are only two possible limiting scenarios, that now
we discuss in turn.
In the first scenario (let us call it fixed-slope scenario),
we can assume that the firms with less than 15 work-
ers have been currently growing unimpeded as long as
they stayed below 15 workers. If this were the case then,
by removing the barrier, the behavior observed below 15
workers would extend to above the threshold. If in addi-
tion as already emphasized we keep constant the number
of firms, then the after-removal behavior would be repre-
sented by an extrapolation of the same −1.645 power law
to A = 25 accompanied by a rescaling to match the total
number of firms. Then we could estimate an additional
number of workers among firms with A > 15 equal to the
area between the best fit 1 and the observed data of Fig.
4, accompanied by a decrease of firms and therefore of
workers employed in firms below threshold. If we denote
by n(Ai) the number of firms with Ai workers, we obtain
an estimate of an additional number of workers equal to
∆Atot =
25∑
i=5
Ai[αnfit(Ai)−n(Ai)] ≈ 130, 000±5000 (2)
where α ≈ 0.95 takes into account the rescaling needed so
that the total number of companies is kept equal to the
original one. The number of additional workers repre-
sents about 5% of the total two and a half million work-
4ers of the pre-1999 sample. The number of companies
with 25 workers would increase from about 2100 to about
3200. We are of course making the tacit assumption that
there is no significant shortage of workers to hire. The
estimate slightly increases if to stay further away from
the theshold we take as natural behavior the trend up to
14 workers (136, 000 new jobs) or 13 (139, 000 new jobs).
These results and the others to be discussed below are
summarized in Tab. (II).
In the second, more conservative, scenario (the fixed-
normalization scenario), we can assume that the firms
with the lowest number of workers would be unaffected by
the barrier removal and would stay the same. Then in or-
der to match the total number of firms we should change
the slope of the power law. This is obtained by a slope
approximately equal to −1.72, i.e. slightly steeper than
before. Using this power law as the after-removal dis-
tribution, we estimate a number of new workers around
89, 000± 5000, i.e. 3.6% of the total sample. Notice that
this result is not an extrapolation of the below-threshold
behavior: it is entirely based on the power-law and the
growth hypotheses.
Any other scenario would have either to lie above the
fixed-normalization scenarios or to violate one of the two
basic assumptions: either it should abandon the hypothe-
sis of a power law, or lead to a number of small firms that
increases when the barrier is removed. In other words,
given the assumptions, the fixed-normalization scenario
produces the most conservative estimate of the number
of additional workers while we can take the fixed-slope
case as a reasonable upper limit.
III. THE 2014 DATA
We repeated the analysis using the 2014 data, con-
sisting of roughly 357,000 private non-agriculture firms
between 5 and 25 workers [11]. Here again the dis-
tribution is characterized by two different slopes (see
Fig. 6), slightly steeper than for the pre-1999 data:
−(1.75±0.006) for A = 5−14 and −2.32 for A = 16−25
(or −2.21 for A = 17−20). The broken power-law distri-
bution remains qualitatively the same even when decom-
posing the data along regional units. Using the fixed-
slope scenario we estimate 198,000 new jobs, i.e. a 5.8%
increase while we obtain 132,000 new jobs (3.9%) with
the fixed-normalization scenario. The fixed-slope figure
remains practically the same (197,000 jobs) if we employ
the fit up to 13 workers. In both cases the error is esti-
mated around 5000 units. See the summary in Tab. (II)
for additional cases.
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Figure 5: Same as Fig. 4, now for the 2014 data. Here the
dot-dashed line represents the fixed-normalization scenario.
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Figure 6: Same as Fig. 4, now for the 2014 data. Here the
dot-dashed line represents the fixed-normalization scenario.
IV. THE AGRICULTURE FIRMS
Contrary to the other cases, the Agri2014 dataset can
be fitted by a single power law with slope −(2.19±0.025):
the χ2 is 26.9 for 19 degrees of freedom (p-value 0.1).
Adopting the fixed-slope scenario and extrapolating the
slope between 5 − 14 workers, we obtain an estimated
increase of 1500±1100 jobs, i.e. 0.8±0.6%, which reduces
to 0.5±0.5% with the fixed-normalization. This confirms
the visual impression from Fig. 2 that the agriculture
firms do not show a significant change around 15 workers.
V. FURTHER TESTS
The analysis can be repeated under slightly different
assumptions.
The error attributed to the Poissonian counts is prob-
ably too optimistic, since it provides a χ2 statistic per
degree of freedom for the pre-1999 data in the range
A = 5− 15 equal to 3.8 (p-value 0.0001). Increasing the
errors by a factor of 1.9 produces a χ2 per degree of free-
dom equal to about 1. The fit nfit(A) remains the same
but the uncertainty on ∆Atot increases slightly from 5000
5data polyn. order fit range method jobs %
pre-1999 1 5-15 FS 130,000 5.2
pre-1999 1 5-14 FS 136,000 5.4
pre-1999 1 5-13 FS 139,000 5.6
pre-1999 1 - FN 89,000 3.6
pre-1999 2 5-14 FS 103,000 4.1
pre-1999 3 5-14 FS 88,000 3.5
pre-1999 4 5-14 FS 120,000 4.8
2014 1 5-14 FS 198,000 5.8
2014 1 5-13 FS 197,000 5.8
2014 1 - FN 132,000 3.9
2014 2 5-14 FS 163,000 4.8
2014 3 5-14 FS 226,000 6.6
2014 4 5-14 FS 446,000 13.0
Agri2014 1 5-14 FS 1500 0.8
Agri2014 1 - FN 900 0.5
Table II: Summary of results (FS=fixed normalization; FS=
fixed slope). The relative error on the number of jobs is
around 5% except for the last two rows, where it is around
70-100%.
to 8000. Removing the entry at A = 15 from the fit, the
p-value increases to 0.02, which could indicate that the
A = 15 entry is slightly anomalous. This is hardly sur-
prising, since it is an average obtained over several years
and therefore will include firms that for some time have
been above threshold; moreover, the very definition of
“number of workers” has been fluctuating over time and
a firm might well decide to stay well below the threshold
to avoid legal complications. The same factor 1.9 also
brings the linear fit for the 2014 data to a χ2 per degree
of freedom close to unity. Note that since the workforce
includes temporary workers at the time of recording, the
average number of workers in a firm fluctuates around
the given values.
The curve data logni vs logAi in the range A = 5−14
can be approximated also by a polynomial of higher order
rather than by a straight line. With a polynomial of order
2,3 or 4 we obtain respectively ∆Atot = 103000, 88000,
120000 for the pre-1999 data. Note however that in these
cases, assuming Poisson errors, the χ2 per degree of free-
dom becomes only 0.5-0.7 and obviously decreases with
more realistic (i.e. larger) errors. Higher order polyno-
mials therefore do not seem to be supported by the data
in the range A = 5 − 14. Higher order polynomial are
instead statistically acceptable fits to the 2014 data, but
then ∆Atot is close to or larger than the straight line
result (see Tab. II).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
From this brief analysis we cannot of course derive in a
mechanical way a causal relationship between the broken
power law n(A) and the Statuto dei Lavoratori. It is also
impossible from this data to establish what other side
effects a reform of the Statuto could have, for instance
whether it will induce merging of small companies rather
than real growth or whether it will modify the employ-
ment of temporary versus open-ended workers.
It seems clear, however, that the behavior of firms does
change in correspondence of 15 workers. Removing the
causes of such behavior, whatever they may be, could
generate from roughly 130,000 to 200,000 new workers
in our sample, about 3.9-5.8% of the total 2014 sample.
These figures are, it should be noted, only a lower esti-
mate, because limited due to lack of data to companies
with fewer than 25 workers.
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